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Anti-Exfil: How a Host Challenge Limits Nonce-Based Key Leakage

A transcript of Andrew Poelstra’s Silicon Salon IV talk, published on November 15, 2026, examines a risk in hardware signing: a signer could leak private-key information through the nonce data it produces for signatures. The discussion uses Schnorr signatures to explain why nonce reuse or bias matters, then considers the limits of deterministic nonces, zero-knowledge proofs and multisignature approaches.

The anti-exfil approach described in the transcript gives the host and signer a joint role in producing the nonce, without requiring them to manage an additional long-term key. The host supplies a random challenge, and the signer produces a nonce adjusted in a way the host can verify. The aim is to prevent the signer from choosing a biased nonce on its own.

The transcript also discusses an implementation in Blockstream Jade, interaction through PSBTs and a historical use involving OpenTimestamps. It does not provide adoption figures or claim that the approach eliminates every possible way a signing device could leak information.