In a joint report reproduced by Deep Tide TechFlow on November 12, 2026, Bitcoin Security Consortium and Presidio Bitcoin argued that quantum computing poses a potential threat to Bitcoin’s signatures—but that no cryptographically relevant quantum computer has yet been demonstrated. The immediate distinction is between Bitcoin whose public keys are already exposed and funds whose public keys become visible only when they are spent.
What would a quantum computer attack?
A sufficiently capable quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm could, in theory, derive a Bitcoin private key from its exposed public key. That would threaten ownership secured by Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve signatures. The report does not identify Bitcoin’s issuance schedule, supply cap or consensus rules as part of this attack surface.
The report describes two routes:
- At rest: Reused addresses and early pay-to-public-key (P2PK) outputs already expose public keys. Citing Project Eleven, the report estimates that roughly 7.1 million BTC, or about 35% of total supply, would be at risk if a capable machine existed today. It says about three-quarters of that amount sits in reused addresses, largely associated with major exchanges. It separately describes roughly 1.8 million BTC in dormant P2PK outputs as likely lost and difficult to move proactively.
- In flight: Spending from an address that previously concealed its public key reveals it while the transaction awaits inclusion in a block. The report describes a window of around 10 minutes, though the actual interval runs from submission to block inclusion. It cites a Google estimate that a sufficiently fast, ready quantum device could calculate one private key in as little as nine minutes. This is a theoretical risk, not a demonstrated theft.
Progress is not a working attack
The report reviews error-correction results and proposed improvements to Shor’s algorithm, including work associated with Google’s Willow chip and research published in 2026. These developments affect estimates of the resources an attack might require; they do not establish that a machine capable of attacking Bitcoin exists. According to the report, the strongest publicly demonstrated system had produced 48 error-corrected logical qubits, against an estimated minimum of about 1,200 needed to break Bitcoin’s elliptic-curve cryptography. Reliable operations across large numbers of logical qubits remain an engineering obstacle.
That gap cuts both ways. It does not justify describing a Bitcoin-breaking machine as available, but it also does not make improvements in algorithms and hardware irrelevant to preparations.
Defenses under discussion
The report places moving funds out of reused addresses first: using previously unused addresses reduces the pool of public keys exposed while funds are at rest and requires no network-wide rule change. It does not remove the separate exposure that arises when a transaction is broadcast.
For longer-term protection, it discusses SHRINCS, Blockstream’s SHA-256-based proposal for quantum-resistant signatures. The report says Blockstream tested it on Liquid in March 2026 and published a Bitcoin Improvement Proposal with contributors in August. It also says a formal security proof remained in progress and that network-wide deployment would require a soft fork. Testing and publication of a proposal are not deployment on Bitcoin.
A harder governance question concerns older P2PK funds whose owners may no longer be able to move them. In a separate breakdown, the report puts approximately 1.7 million BTC across some 20,000 P2PK addresses, including an estimated 1.1 million BTC attributed to Satoshi Nakamoto. It outlines three approaches under discussion: continue allowing old-style spends, limit the rate at which vulnerable funds can move, or freeze old-style spends while providing a proof-based recovery route for original holders. None is presented as an agreed network policy.
Source: techflowpost.com (originally published 2026-11-12 09:58 UTC+8)
